My office this week. No plug for my Nespresso machine. Damn.
27 May 2017 (Ramallah, West Bank, Palestine) – And here I thought I was going to spend a quiet week in an occupied country. Fat chance.
Even many conservatives were horrified. But stop yourself and consider. People are hearing “we’re not fighting World War III for our NATO Allies.” But they’re not hearing the rest of the statement, which is “we WILL fight for them if they’ll stop freeloading.”
In other words, Trump is demanding the U.S. stop giving welfare to Europe. So before I get into that, let me throw some numbers at you (with a hat tip to two members of my media team, Catarina Conti and Brick Susko, for pulling this info together on a weekend):
- Europe’s economy is almost as large as America’s: these are not the Marshall Plan years. And yet America foots 73% of the alliance’s total bill and many of the alliance’s 28 members are such freeloaders that even Obama has called them out for it.
- To get a little clearer on the numbers, currently, the US spends 3.61% of its GDP on defense, Greece is second at 2.36% (yes, Greece), and little Estonia is third at 2.2%.
- The UK and Poland also exceed the goal, spending 2.17% and 2.01% respectively.
- But then you get into the countries who are falling behind; most are, and some of them in drastic fashion. France is close to the goal at 1.8%, and Turkey isn’t that far off at 1.69%. Norway is three-quarters of the way there at 1.5%, as are Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania, and Portugal is at 1.4%.
- From there, things go south real quick. Germany spends just 1.2% of its GDP on defense, as does the Netherlands, Denmark, Albania, Croatia, and Slovakia. Italy spends 1.11%. Canada spends just over half the stated goal at a paltry 1%, as does the Czech Republic and Hungary. Spain spends 0.9%, as does Belgium. Tiny Luxembourg spends just 0.4% of its GDP on its own defense.
- Tyler Rogoway, an aviation intel analyst who really crunches this space, wrote: “For those countries that are spending, say, 1.5% of GDP and above, getting to the 2% goal seems attainable without major systemic changes in their spending habits. But when you see relatively affluent countries like Germany and Canada being so far off, it is troubling to say the least”.
- Nor is Trump identifying a new problem. This has always been true, even during the latter years of the Cold War. But at least then, Ronald Reagan could legitimately justify America’s extra effort in the interests of deterring an actual World War III. The chances of a World War III today are … well, a lot lower. So why should we put up with freeloaders?
A Trump spokesperson said “Trump is for NATO, and all he wants is for our allies to pull their own weight. And shame on all the disingenuous pansies in Washington who are terrified of an American leader actually looking out for the interests of Americans”. (Ok, that last line was actually mine).
A lot of this is really about America’s global hegemony. Right now, American hegemony is generally accepted as a fact. Only its duration is in question. Will it end next year, within several years, or will it last for many decades hence? Ultimately, the answer to how long American hegemony will endure will not be given by a rising new threat from, say, China or terrorism. Rather, the quality of American leaders will provide it. Put simply, how it’s leaders use American hegemony will determine whether or not we lose it.
I will admit I am guided very much by the writings of William Odom, most specifically his 2005 book America’s Inadvertent Empire. Yes, a 12-year old book. But he was so prescient (I read the book in 2010). He begins by stating the obvious: America presides over an empire, but it began by acquiring this empire inadvertently. It was not a traditional type of empire, but rather, a sui generis one; that is, it is a regime type heretofore unknown.
But the American empire has been a money making, not a money losing regime, and the military hound dogs saw gold in them that hills. Which is why today we have 782 military bases world-wide (at least the ones we know about). Throughout the Cold War, when the defense budget on average consumed 7.2 percent of GDP, the United States sustained unprecedented growth. So too did Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Both had their longest periods of peace and greatest prosperity, parallel to America’s prosperity during the Cold War. Contrary to popular belief, however, Japan and Europe did not get rich at our expense. In fact, throughout this period the U.S. has maintained between 20 and 30 percent of the world’s Gross Product. I refer you to the two definitive books on this (which I often quote): Robert Gordon’s The Rise and Fall of American Growth, and Tony Judt’s Post War.
Most importantly, its military alliances in Europe and Asia have supplied supranational political-military governance for its allies, many of whom were once at enmity amongst themselves. These U.S. military umbrellas provide its allies the mutual trust that, in turn, lowers business transaction costs, and permits these states to capture greater gains from trade. Today, these trust-inducing and economic roles are still needed in both regions, even without an external military threat.
But as Odom says in his book, this can get expensive and at some point there will be an economic down turn or maybe even popular calls for changes (BANG!). Because every country is unique, with their own histories, pressing issues and challenges. And each member is motivated to spend money on defense due to different elements—some of them geographical, some of them sociological and some are economical. And getting back to NATO, that’s the hard part. Because that 2% of GDP metric is going to rub up against what each member is motivated to spend on defense due to the elements I outlines above. For instance, France largely supports its own defense industry. And just going off a static percentage of GDP figure doesn’t tell the whole story as to why a country may be far from the agreed-upon goal.
And there is a point that Rogoway makes. He says Trump and his team seem to ignore suggestions the military have made to improve NATO, and reduce costs. He says:
The Pentagon has said the US could do more by providing surplus weaponry to less fortunate NATO allies, who can then take the money saved on costly procurement and spend it on operations. This would help with enhancing NATO’s military presence in the eastern stretches of Europe, and would mean countries located there could rely less on the US for day-to-day deterrence. In the end it would likely save the US money and enhance NATO’s collecting war fighting ability in the process.
Because the big question is how do you get dozens of NATO member countries to decide on another rubric for required defense spending?
And Trump has to worry about the U.S military manufacturers who supply the bulk of the hardware to NATO. Because of the policy on “interoperability,” that is Nato personnel must be able to use the same military equipment, and it must all be compatible with U.S. systems to U.S. companies are the key suppliers. When East European countries came on board NATO, it was music to the ears of these U.S. military contractors: it was out with the old Soviet military hardware and in with sales of, for example, Lockheed’s military aircraft costing millions and millions of dollars. Cut off that gravy train? Not likely.
I will agree with the Trump team on one point (not Trump himself; he has no freaking sense of history). The debate was clearer during the Cold War. With NATO forces staring down Warsaw Pact armies in East Germany, the military minds of Europe and North America faced the problem of devising the Continent’s defense strategy, as they had done since even before the bloc’s founding. The advent of nuclear weapons only made the situation more precarious. While the objective was straightforward, the strategy to achieve it was simple. The U.S. was in charge. And NATO was configured to give it the most operational power … a situation that remains today. And let’s face it, with its unilateral operation, the United States has managed to circumvent the lack of overall commitment and coherence in NATO.
But after the Cold War ended, the threat to NATO changed. Instead of Warsaw Pact armies in Germany, it now faces threats less focused on conventional capabilities. Russia, even without its large Soviet armies, retains its vast nuclear weapons arsenal and other asymmetric tools (i.e. cyberwarfare) that could be used with great effect against its foes. NATO has also taken on the fight against transnational terrorism.
And NATO itself has changed dramatically. With Turkey in, NATO’s membership also reaches into the Middle East, providing the alliance with a long, uninterrupted front that can be leveraged against any potential Russian threat.
But that expansion to the Middle East has brought several risks, however. NATO is now much closer to a number of military threats in the region, and member Turkey, which has the largest conventional army among NATO’s European members, occupies a key position within the alliance. Oh, snap!
So the point to me is not “who pays and how much” but that modern threats such as hybrid warfare or cybersecurity can exploit any weakness in a divided bloc. These less existential asymmetric threats offer an even greater hurdle. As scenarios change, the single constant throughout NATO’s history is the fact that its true value hinges on the individual resolve of member states to act together when a real threat presents itself. The rest of the world waits to see if the alliance is still committed to that cause. Or if Europe truly feels it needs to go it alone.